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The Sullivan Principles smokescreen
m  evaluating the consequences of the $1.7 Billion currently 
invested by U.S. corporations in South Africa, the issue is 
distinctly not whether or not the U.S. firms involved have
\ yadopted the Sullivan . Principles. Those principles, purportedly 
designed to ensure upgrading and equal pay for blacks, are in 
reality little more than a smokescreen. Behind their rhetoric, 
U.S. transnational corporations continue to help South Africa 
Build up its military-industry machinery to ' pert>afetiete oppression 
of the majority of black workers.
The fact is that directly-held investments of U.S. firms in 
South Alnca employ only about 100,000 workers, less than one 
percent of all South African workers. Only about half of these 
are African.Because U.S. firms invest in highly capital-intensive 
technologically advanced projects, a high proportion of their 
workers are skilled white workers. Sven if U.S. firms were to 
comply with the Sullivan Principles, tney would not signficantly 
improve the conditions of low pay and poverty of the vast majority 
of African workers.
The primary contribution which U.S. firms make to South 
Africa's political economy is the introduction of advanced, capi­
tal intensive technologies which increase productivity while
reducing labor requirements. Texaco, for example, provided 
data trying to prove that it had upgraded Afriaan workers over 
the years from 19U2 to 1977. Scrutiny of the data shows, however, 
that, while the company significantly increased productivity
- 2-
over the fifteen year period, it had actually reduced the total
number of employees by several thousand. Moreover, it had reduced 
the number of blacks by more than the numbers of whites. The pro­
portion of African emnloyees dropped from 62% of the labor force
ir 1Q62 to fyV' in 1977. f ?t from irproving the conditions of 
black workers, U.S. investment in capital-intensive technologies 
have actually contributed to increasing the numbers of African 
unemployeed.
furthermore, careful studies have exposed the difficulties
\ !%of enforcing affirmative action by U.S. firms in the United States,
where the force of federal law may be brought to bear against
violators. One may be justifiably sceptical about the extent
to which these same firms are likely .’voluntarily to comply with
the Sullivan Principles in South Africa where compliance
will certainly conflict with local custom and, in some cases,
&violate the law.
It seems difficult to accept at face value;, 
the companies' public relations assurances tnat they will conform 
with the Sullivan Principles. The South African press has 
carried stories pointing out that U.S. parent firms are not always 
aware of what their south African subsidiaries' labor policies 
are. The well-publicized story of Polaroid further illustrates 
thi_lack of U.S. headquarters' knowledge of South African affiliates' 
activities in sensitive areas. Polaroid pledged not to let its 
South African affiliate sell its film or equipment to tne South 
African government for use^n the pass books, a key tool for 
enforcing apartheid. several years later, it was revealed that 
South African affiliate had continued to sell to the South
African government, allegedly without informing the parent company.
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South Arnica*s military industrial complex
The overwhelmingly critical issue involved in continued
U.S. investment in South Al'rica is not whether the U.S.
companies endorse the Sullivan Trircciples. bather it is their 
role in helping to build up tne south Arrican military-industrial 
conrolex.
Direct U.S. investments in south Africs iltiplied irom less 
tnan $300 million to over $lm7 billion in the last decade, 
precisely during the years when tne white minority state 
capitalist regime was increasingly systematically enrorcing 
apartheid. U.S. firms today directly finance about 17% of all 
foreign investment in south Africa. More significantly, their 
investments are concentrated in critical sectors. They provide 
257° of all transnational copporate investment in tne Soutn 
Arrican manufacturing industries, which in turn makes up about 
l]0u/o of all south African manufacturing investment.
It might be noted that U.S. firms were expanding their 
investment in Soutn African manufacturing in particular in 
tne years wnen nearly 50 newly independent countries in the 
rest of the continent were desparately seeking foreign capital 
for their industries. About d07o of U.s. investment in manufacturing 
in Africa are in south Africa. About 97% of U.S. investment in 
basic manufacturing industries on the continent is in South 
Africa.
To fully comprehend the role of U.s. investments in south 
Africa, one has to understand the nature of manufacturing 
industry and its contribution to building up tne south African 
military-industrial complex. The south African government has 
deliberately sought to encourage the growth of its industrial 
base as the foundation, not only for economic expansion, but also
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for military growtn. While youth Africa must still import 
the most advanced aircraft and other military equipment and 
machinery, its own industries can now produce domestically a 
substantial share of its military requirements.
Tfie kind of modern military machine which youth Africa's
Wminority must maintainyto perpetuate its rule is highly capi­
tal intensive. it has to enable ths limited body of white 
troops to become highly mobile and efficient, covering vast 
territories and controlling large numbers of widely dispersed 
enemies. Therefore, the government has sought to acquire 
the most modern means of transport on air, sea and land; computer­
ized telecommunications and administrative techniques; and 
nuclear weapons.
To ensure the development of the industrial base in a 
direction calculated to most effectively help build up this 
essential military-industrial machine, the youth African 
uovernment has long intervened directly in the economy through 
a series of parastatals, state corporations which cooperate 
closely witn tne private sector. These are closely inter-linked 
through capital and members of their boards of directors to the 
government on the one hand, and to the mining finance houses that 
dominate the private sector on tne other. There is, in other 
words, no such thing as the 'tree play of market forces' in the 
south Aincan economy. firms investing there must inevitably b 
become enmeshed in a tight network of parastatal-private company- 
linkages, as illustrated in Uhart 1.
youth Arnca's state capitalist regime has cooperated with 
the mining linance houses and transnational firms to extend its 
domination, not only over the oiacks within its borders, but also 
into neighboring countries. This is most evident in the case or 
Namibia. There, the youth African government continues to
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exercise the colonial authority it assumed at the ena or World 
War i,despite United Nations effort's® to help the Namioian 
peoples ootain independence. Over the years, South African 
policy has opened up Namibia's wealth to South African mining 
finance houses collaborating with transnational corporations.
The Tsumeb copper mine, owned by Uhe U.s. firms, AMAX and 
Newmont, together with South African interests, is the biggest.
The Kossing uranium mine, developed by KioTinto Zinc and South 
African and other European interests, is perhaps even more 
important to south Africa's plans for military-economic domi­
nation of the region. South Africa's government is determined 
to mreate conditions for continued exploitation of .Namibia, 
even if it attains titular independents.
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are linked to South Africa 
in a Uustoms Union which it dominates through its industrial 
might. hssentially, these small neighbors, especially Swaziland 
and Lesotho, have been reduced to little more than glorified 
bantustans. Their main mineral wealth is excavated by Anglo- 
American corporate affiliates, either alone or in collaboration 
with U.S. or other foreign firms. The systematic underdevelopment 
of their economies has forced their populations to become an 
impoverished labor rdserve, available for employment on South 
African mines and farms when demand warrants.
The white minority illegally ruling Khodesia.clearly could 
not remain in office without South African support. The South 
African mining finance houses, especially Anglo-American, together 
with western transnational firms, provide the necessary conduit 
for the continued flow of manufactured goods, including modern 
weapons of war and oil, without which the minority regime could 
not remain in office for a week. The U.S. government's misplaced
reliance on South Africa to mediate can on^y serve to foster South
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Africa's efforts toperpetuate this profitable connection after 
Zimbabwe wins political independence.
The role of U.S. firms
U.S. investments made in this context inevitably contribute 
to strengthen South Africa's essential industrial base, expansi on 
of its military capacity, and its continued domination of the 
southern African region. This is illustrated by evidence relating 
to the role of the major U.S. transnational corporate investments 
there.
U.S. firms have played a major role in building up South 
Africa's transportation facilities, a critical contribution to 
a minority regime whose scarce high level manpower must be 
able to move rapidly throughout extended territories. Ceneral 
Motors, along with Ford and Chrysler, produces a manjor share 
of SouthAfrica' s trucks and cars. It also produces locomotives 
for Use by the South African government's parastatal, SAH&hR.
The South African subsidiaries of ceneral Motors are manned by 
persons 'dedicated' to the South African regime.
Vic Bear, of the UM .National Council {South Africa), 
declared^during a campaign to raise funds for the South 
African Army:
l respectfully accept *the acc.olade (, ‘dedicated' ), 
knowing fullwell that ail 2i|l of the Chevrolet 
healers are determined to give of their best in 
working with you and ail serving Army personnel in the 
hi million fund-raising target. * )
But more than that: CM itself has been designated as a
National Key Boint industry because of its strategic importance
Tor the continued operation or the southbArrican military, 
secret
in a 1 y memorandum delivered by hand to the Detroit CM 
ofiice^cM's south African affiliate spelled out the implications
of this status:
industries or services as designated as national Key .Points 
...will be accorded protention in emergencies through the 
medium of the uitizen Force Commando system...(white 
personnel) are encouraged by authorities to join a local 
commando unit.
The memo explains the dual role of top tiM personnel under
military control:
"The’u.K. commando’ would assume guarding responsibility:____
for the U-.M. plants and would fall under the control 
of the local military authority for the duration of 
the emergency. it is envisaged... that plant personnel 
could be engaged ina composite function, i.e., part 
normal work and part guard duty in such situations.
This doubleM-edgeu role is required for top u-.M. personnel
because of the relative scarcity of skilled whites;
....compulsory military service is applicable only to 
White males citizens. The concept ofutilizing plant 
personnel in a dual function is related to the fact 
tnat key skills, technical and managerial expertise are 
concentrated in the same po ulatxon group from which 
defence requirements . - ? must be drawn, 
it seems unlikely
'"1 .... 'b;' '.tnat tone prmniples proposed by Sullivan,
a member of the cfl international board of directors, could,
ic ounter balance l (Valuaole/
even if enforce?!, o' i5/the ' ->/con€r’ibution of the
south African uM’ \ y-q role in supporting the
Write minority regime in its designated statuses a National____
Key Point. While evidence has not come to light specifically 
implicating other U.S. firms as National Key Points, they play 
a role which would qualify themx for the same dubious status.
U.S. fiansnantional corporations' South African affiliates 
produce the elctrical equipment and appliances
essential to electrify and automate the minority's industrial
and military activities. International Telephone and Telegraph (i'i"
the ninth largest firm in 'the U.S., has extensive operations 
in South Africa. An ITT afiliate, Standard Telephone and 
Cables (STC) is one of South Africa's largest electrical 
manufacturing concerns, producing a wide range of tehhnologically 
complex electrical equipment. it supplied communications 
equioment for the police and[simonstown .Naval base and recruited 
engineers to operate it. In 197b, it reported that 70 percent
of its sales were made to the south African U-overnment lthough 
ITT sold a majority of its shares in STU to South African partners 
recetly, it continues to provide advanced technological inouts 
and managerial assistance as necessary.
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South African (General Electric (SAGB) produces a wide range
of basic equipment: industrial controls, capacitators, locomotives,
and so on. Thesahave important military applications. sAHM
'is an important supplier of government's h'SUOM'which is building
ana maintaining the national electricity grid, including nuclear
power plants, to facilitate the use of the most sophisticated
technologies in all sectors of the economy, General hlectric
i £teuholds 15 percent of a largej(West Herman firm), AkG-TStier unken, 
which has become another of South Africa's major manufacturers 
of electrical equipment. AMG-Telefunken is heavily involved in 
providing comoonents for Project Advocaat, an advanced military 
communications system that is part of the military build-uo on
V5?the Gape route, vk
Sperry hand has a South African subsidiary which sells hY.g 
worth of aerospace, communications and farm equipment annually. 
Much of this equipment may be used for military as well as 
civilian purposes'^v:://
Motorola assembles and sells electronic equipment in south 
Africa. in 1977> about 15 percent of its sales there were to 
agencies of the South African (iovernment, including two-way 
radios used by military police. While it has agredd to end 
direct sales to the South African army and police, it continues 
its other sales in South Africa which may always find their 
way to military uses
International Business Machines (.IBM) sells a thirh of its 
South African sales to the Government. It has supplied the 
regime's police and Defence Department and its nuclear program 
Uomputerization plays a vital role in South Africa, above and
!.\k
beyond direct military uses, by enabling the white minority 
to retain a tight grip on gsaagement and supervisory jobs 
despite a; shortage of white ton-level personnel, without up-
grading blacks.
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A number of U.S. firms have helped South Africa build up 
its 1 nuclear capacity with _ obvious military implications.
As experts have emphasized, there is no such thing as a solely 
peaceful military technology'\z/^
South Africa bought its first nuclear reactor. Safari T, 
from the U.S. under the ’Atoms for Peace’ prgoram. Allis*
Chalmers helped to install it. South African nuclear scientists 
were trained at the U.S. Atomic fnergy Commission laboratory 
in Oak Ridge. - - ; ^ The U.S. has provided enriched uranium
to South Africa as recently as . ' . 1 9 7 5 ^
The foxboro Corporation sold South Africa’s Pelindaba nuclear 
center two computer s^^The french firm, framatome, a member of 
rthe < - - i consortium contracted to build the Koeburg nuclear 
power station, is 15 percent owned by Westinghouse. Westinghouse 
supplies it long-term licenses for the advanced technology required
f or . * building nuclear projects Ml/
/naturalj
Since South Africa itself has nc^ /dll reserves, ihe minority
regime has been highly dependent on transnational corporations,
including those from the U.S., to build up its oil-from-coal
capacity, arici . ) accumulate stored reserves, as well as
to pass on supplies to Rhodesia. SASOL, the South African
uovernment-owned oil-from-co&l project, was built with U.S. and
fRU- transnational corporate assistance. SASUL is building its
second large project with the assistance of fluor, a California —
\lo/based construction firm, and badger, a subsidiary of Raytneon.x/ 
Roneywell is to provide much of the necessary electrical equipment.
U.s. firms have invested heavily in refining and distributing 
oil throughout southern Africa, basing their operations on their 
South African refineries. They|import tneir crude oil fran tneir
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wells elsewhere, mainly Iran, and. refine it in South
Africa!. Mobil rerines about 90% or the oil it rerines in 
Arrica in youth Africa* . $s evidence has been
\^y
r\ ^  -lproduced to prove, it also ships oil to Khodesia in violation
youth African refinery, expanded its capacity in 1975 to 
100,000 barrels daily. caltex also owns almost a rourth of 
Mobili's lubricating oil refinery in Durban.
Transnational banks, especially those from the U.y., have 
played an increasingly important role in assisting youtn Africa’s 
military-industrial complex *" . deal with the growing unrest of
the oppressed black population. They have helped mobilize 
domestic and international capital to assist Mouth African 
and transnational corporations to finance their growing invest­
ments in youth Africa's economy; and in the crisis of the 1970s 
they came to the rescue by furnishing huge international loans 
to the government and parastatals as well as to the so»called 
'private' sector.
Transnational banks, especially Barcla^f and ytandard banks, 
hold about oO percent of the assets of the 20 largest banks 
in youth Africa. Tne three top banks in the United ytates -- 
the bank of America, citibank and chase Manhattan -- ' have
significant activities there, both directly and througn their
. _  . \*>relationships with ' • British banksv; citibank is the
fourth largest transnational bank in terms of assets in youth 
Africa, and has three branches operating there. it admits 
holding Mouth African government bonds, in compliance with 
youth African law^  in effect lending iunds to the white minority 
regime. Citibank owns lb2/^ of the British merchant bank,
M. yamuels, which constitutes an additional channel for its youth
of California ytandard Oil and Texaco's
citibank also owns 1+9 perbdnt of the BritishAfrican business
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oank, onndlays, . urindlayS' chairman sits on Piticorp's
board, urindlays has major holdings in Khodesia, including
one oi‘ the lour largest comraercial banks there.
uhase Manhattan dlosed down it sA south African branches when
(Udrtk ay<?r I ooO b r\dA(} 'ihH'CO‘J
it acquired a 15 percent share in the Standard b a n k W h e n  the
u.s. federal Trade pommission required Phase to divest itself 
of its Standard holdings because Standard began to ooerate in 
the U.s., phase re-established a representative office in South 
Alrica, Xf continues to work in close cooperation with Standard 
in providing credit ana international links for major corporate 
investors. ___ ______
The sritish subsidiary of sank of America shares tnree directors
with^Qjsinwprjt_ senson .Lonsdale and its afriliates. Une is director 
C i k < .  l i n ' h s h
of tne consortium bank, Midland and international oanks, Ltd., 
whicn includes Midland sank and Standard, both of which have 
large South African holdings. Kleinwort senson helped tne South 
African government establish tne Accepting sank for industry, 
a merchant bank, and holds shares in it. Kleinwort Senson Lonsdale 
also holds a 33 percent interest in J.L. Plark and Pompany, an 
industrial holding company in South Africa.
in the military and economic crisis which beset South Africa 
in the mid-1970s, u.s. transnational banks mobilized about a third 
of the vast sums of international capital billion --
which transnational corporate finance institutions funnelled into 
the country'; -Li: impossible to break loans into 'civil’ and
'military' components. While it is difficult to identify the
details of all the loans fade by U.s. firms, it is clear that
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U.S. banks maae a major contribution to the beleagered regime.
The Bank of America, ror example, admitted that it has loaned $loo
i/#lmost j
million to south Africa as of 1977, h a fourth was
to the South African government. But, as the discussion of
tne interrelations between public and private corporations snould
make clear, even loans to the private sector contribute indirectly
to building up the military-industrial complex, enabling it to
import essential technologies for industrial development, a-s w/^l/ Q s
treeing up otner tunds for the purchase of military equipment
and oil. What is distressing is that the United States
togovernment assisted the U.S. financial institutikons^lend funds 
to South Africa by providing indurance and guarantees for 
loand to finance exports to that country, from 1972 to 197b, 
the U.S. Bxport Jdnport Bank insured or guaranteed trade with 
South Africa wofcth about $b91 million. m  1977, bx-Im bank 
agreements included funds for turbo-commander aircraft, as well 
as essential capital and equipment for the military-industrial 
sector.
By the late 1970s, as the dollar's value plummeted, South
African gold rose rapidly in value, reaching well over $200 an
ounce. At that point, U.S. banks* loans were not as critical
to the South African government. They pontinued to play an
important supportive role, nevertheless, by helping South Africa.
icMtorS> ito sell its gold, including al * million^worth of Krug^trrands,
on the world market; and by financing continued industrial expansion 
of transnational corporate investors.'
In short, United States corporations have played a major rol e 
in building up and supplying the South African military and 
industrial complex. By concentrating their African manufacturing 
investments in South Africa, they have contributed to transforming 
that country-'-s political economy into a regional sub-imperialist
- m -
center. south Africa has been able to utilize U.S. funds and
technological advances to strengthen its minority-operated
military-industrial complex and its ability to withstand the
efforts of the African populations to win liberation. 
is U.S. investment in Soutn Arrica important to the U.S?
Tt}e Sputh African lobby in the U.S. has published ad_s in
\yythe Via 11 Street Journaly obviously designed to convince U.S.
the
investors to continue to help build up/apartheid economy, in 
which they argue that the U.s. will be the loser if B.s. rirms 
cut off investment there. These arguments are false.
hirst, U.S. corporate investments, even the biggest ones 
like those of General Motors^,constitute only a small percentage 
of U.S. rirms’ world-wide assets-r- typically less tnan 2%. These 
investments are not vital to the profitabil^o? u.s. corporations. 
They are, however, crucial to survival of the South African regime.
Second, ill' U.S. firms leave, the south African apologists 
maintain, tne firms from surope and Japan will take their place.
The fact is that, increasingly, U.s. firms have been giving 
leadership to European and Japanese firms with involvement in 
Soutn Africa. In a number of cases, they own shares in them, 
in fact, Japan’s government prohibits investments of its nationals 
in South Africa, so Japanese firms, in which U.S. firms hold 
shares, send their machinery and equipment to U.S. firms’" factories 
to be assembled and sold in the South African market. General 
MotoEKs, for example, assembles and sells trucks and cars pro-
\VJ/duced by its Japanese affiliate.V if the U.S. firms with drew.
the European and Japanese firms, pressured by their own anti­
apartheid movements, would probably follow suit.
Mi-
Third, the south African lobby insists that South African 
minerals, especially chrome, are essential to the U.S. This is 
grossly exaggerated. The fact is that because of past Ux&x in­
volvement of U.S. firms, the U.S. has tended to rely on minerals 
imported from southern Africa. This is especially true of chrome, 
produced by Union uarbide in Khodesia and South Africa —  and 
Union Carbide has been a major supporter of the South African lobby
in the United States. But there are other sources of such
minerals. The U.S. itself has large stockpiles. And if the 
U.S. firms spent the same amount of time exploring for new 
deposits in independent Africa as they have in South Africa, 
or in developing substitutes, Sbuth Africa's control of mineral
resources would become decreasingly _ j significant.
The attitude of South African blacks
it”is argued by South African and U.S. corporate spokesmen
that for U.S. corporations .bo end tneir trade with and invest­
ment in South Africa would harm the black populations of the 
region. These crocadile tears hardly seem justified.
Transnational corporate investments in the most capital-intensive 
sectors of the economy reduce employment potentials of South 
Africa's industrialized eeonomy. Unemployment today in South
Africa is estimated to be about 2 million, about a firth of
iadults I
adult male workers. (Women ^  are excluded from the esti­
mates, as it is assumed they do not seek work, though i if
to live in the towns with their families, it is probable that 
many more would seek jobs if they could find them,) Beyond that, 
South Africa's oppressive regime ensures profitable business 
for U.S. and other corporate interests by holding down the
i apartheid permitted them
wages of the masses of the pppulation.
--.v^those without work back into the Bantustans, too, they
deny them any unemployment compensation or social security
payments; the Bantustan Administrations have no funds to provide 
tne amenities of a welfare state. This may keep taxes down for
the white minority and corporate interests, but the r.e^ul£ing
hunger and diseases that decimate the^popu-
lation h-aa been aptly characterized by the liberation movement as genocide.
The black population's snokesmen, when given the onportunity 
have voiced growing opposition to transnational
corporate investments.
The African National Congress has long urged withdrawal of 
transnational corporate investments and trade. Steve Biko 
and the Black Peoples Convention expressed their opposition.
Apologists f'cr the South African regime ha>e claimed that 
U.S. businessmen who ha^e asked have found no one who opposes 
continued investment. But they neglect to point out that under 
South African law it is an offence punishable by jail -- or 
worse -- to oppose foreign investment. On the other hand, former 
U.S. Ambassador to South Africa, William Bowdler, cabled the
the black population to Continued U.S. trade and investment 
What is perhaps most intriguing s the fact that when a U.s.
south Africa's motor industry, where uM, P'ord and U.s. tire 
firms are among important employers, the workers"complained oi 
inadequate training, joo reservation, lack of union status, ar­
bitrary p'Cfrrflfltion, abuse by sA foremen and job insecurity...."
t favSMer'i^cable concluded:
With radicalization of black attitudes, tendency to call 
for divestment grows stronger. Added to heightened 
expectations from new U.S. administration on south 
African issues, must be expected that role of American 
firms here will become increasingly controversial and less 
persuasive to growing number of blacks.
U.S. that he found growing opposition among hJl. segments of
embassy officer visited fort Elizabeth, a center of
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The responsibility of - "*■ American scholars^
American scholars,concerned with tne way u.s. corporate
involvement in south Airica has strengthened the white minority's
military-industrial complex, jTolay an important role in
alerting the U.S. academic and broader community to the growing 
dangers of the smtouation there.
Many students and faculty throughout the United States '
have been . ' r -- urging University boardsof
trustees to * sell the stock of companies wth investments
in South Airica. * y This has had a significant
impact in terms of bringing tne issues involved to the public.
_  \3$
x the Association of Uoncerned African Scholars (AUASyf 
is urging its members to take additional actions to bring the 
facts to the broader community. Among other techniques 
they suggest are: letters and articles in
local newspapers; radio and TV forums and debates; and.es­
tablishment of a local faculty-student speakers bureau which 
could bring the facts to church, trade union, i and
other community groups. *■ AuAs also urges its members to 
- talk with local dongressipensons and city ana 
state officials about the * , ir is: . importance
of ending u.s. government support for US firms'involvement
in South Africa. specifically, concerned scholars could
urge tightening up of the U.S. government's enforcement 
of the U.N. military embargo, extending it to cover nuclear 
as well as conventional military ;supplies and equipment; 
urge passage of legislation to end U.s. tax credits for 
firms with investments in south Africa; and, perhaps most 
important, support United Nations sanctions against any 
further trade Wittk or investment in South Airica.
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